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ABSTRACT 
ASEAN’s fast economic growth and rising importance in global trade and capital 
flows are increasing the region’s geopolitical relevance, helping it emerge as a key 
international player. One of the main causes contributing to this transformation is the 
possession of large reserves of strategic minerals, precious stones and fossil fuels. 
However, this natural wealth brings important political and economic challenges that 
question the region’s capacity to escape from the political economic phenomenon of 
the resource curse. This underlines the existing uncertainties about ASEAN’s ability 
to transform its economic growth into real human development.  
This research seeks to assess ASEAN’s regional and domestic current socio-political 
and economic panorama, evaluating areas of risks and progresses within the context 
of the resource curse.   
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RESUMEN 
El rápido crecimiento económico de ASEAN, unido a su creciente relevancia en 
materia de comercio exterior y flujo de capitales, están incrementando la importancia 
geopolítica de la región, haciendo que aflore como un importante actor internacional. 
Uno de los motivos principales detrás de esta transformación es la posesión de 
grandes reservas de minerales estratégicos, piedras preciosas y combustibles 
fósiles. Sin embargo, esta riqueza natural trae consigo importantes retos político-
económicos que ponen en entredicho la capacidad de la región para hacer frente al 
fenómeno conocido como maldición de los recursos, cuestionando si ASEAN será 
capaz de transformar su crecimiento económico en desarrollo humano. 
Este proyecto pretende analizar el panorama actual sociopolítico y económico de 
ASEAN a nivel regional y doméstico, evaluando las áreas de riesgo y los progresos 
acometidos en el contexto de la maldición de los recursos. 
 
 
 
 
Palabras-clave: Maldición de los recursos, ASEAN, desarrollo sostenible, gestión de 
recursos naturales, economía política. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Research Problem 
With an extension of more than 4.4 million square kilometres and with more than 600 
million people making up around 9% of the global population, the ten member states 
of the Association of South East Asian Nations -Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam- are emerging as important international players, turning the region into a 
global strategic area.  
In the period 2010-2011, the region received 7.4% of global Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) inflows, while in 2012 its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) made up 
3.1% of the world's total (ASEAN, 2014) and the regional average economic growth1 
was 5.5%(OECD, 2013 pp.2).2 In addition, currently, it is the third top merchandise 
exporter of the world representing 7% of the global exports (WTO, 2013 pp.13). 
Furthermore, social and macroeconomic restructuration predicts a further growth of 
private consumption that will translate into an increase in trade flows (OECD, 2013 
pp.3). Moreover, in terms of supply chains, Southeast Asia is emerging as a key 
global player in many different product categories (ASEAN, 2014).3 In this context, 
the multiple Free Trade Agreements signed by the organisation and other 
neighbouring countries like Japan, China, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand 
are likely to increase ASEAN’s  trading importance worldwide (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2014).4  
On a regional level, ASEAN has promoted the creation of two regional platforms to 
promote cooperation: the ASEAN Plus Three, a plan to increase cooperation with 
East Asian nations in the fields of politics, security, trade and investment, agriculture 
                                                 
1
 Note that data from Myanmar has been excluded. 
2
 Similarly, forecasts for the period 2014-2018 expect an average 5.4 annual growth. 
3
 In this paper, ASEAN and Southeast Asia have been used as synonyms.  
4
 Apart from these bilateral agreements, ASEAN is also negotiating a Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership
4
 –RCEP-, an agreement that would unify these six bilateral trading agreements 
into one big regional pact (Australian Government). 
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and sustainable development (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014); and the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, to encourage dialogue and foster diplomacy (ASEAN Secretariat, 2011).5 
However, ASEAN is a region of political, cultural and economic contrasts. 
Governance indicators highlight important divergences in the quality of policy-making 
between the different member states (World Bank Institute, 2013).6 Also, the different 
cultural influences from India, China, Portugal, Spain, America and indigenous Malay 
people, have contributed to the emergence of many different local idiosyncrasies.  
Similarly, enormous differences in infrastructural and urbanisation levels emphasise 
social regional disparities. Moreover, while the economic growth and development of 
Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia is very optimistic, views concerning the 
performances of countries like Indonesia and Philippines are still doubtful (ASEAN, 
2014).  
These divergences translate into different domestic economic characteristics. For 
instance, Brunei and Singapore are the wealthiest states, the former driven by the 
power of oil, while trade, innovation, and high-end services are the main economic 
drivers for the latter; Indonesia has a small fiscal deficit, strong growth, and low 
government and external debt burdens; Thailand and Malaysia keep on growing 
steadily; Cambodia and Laos, are propelled by their natural resources abundance 
and the influence of rapidly growing neighbouring markets; while Vietnam continues 
to run high external current account and fiscal deficits, and has a large state 
enterprise sector (Nehru, 2012). 
Nevertheless, with the exception of Singapore, all ASEAN countries have a common 
economic feature: their economies are to different degrees dependent on natural 
resources (Nehru, 2012). In this sense, on an average regional basis7, during the 
period 2002-2012 total natural resource rents accounted for 15% of the region's GDP 
                                                 
5
 It is also important to point out that there are other regional initiatives oriented to boost cooperation in 
which ASEAN MS are involved like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. However as not all MS are involved, 
this report only makes explicit  reference to those project carried out on behalf of ASEAN.   
6
 This issue will be developed later on in the report. 
7
 Note that Singapore and Myanmar have been excluded. In the case of the former, the reason has 
been its condition as resource-poor country, while in the case of the latter there were no statistical 
data available. 
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(The World Bank).8 Yet, the degree and extend of this dependency differs widely9, 
being Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia the countries 
where natural resources have the greatest contribution to their GDP (The World 
Bank).10 Actually, in 2012, exports of fuels and mining products of Thailand, 
Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia accounted for 21.4% of the total exports of this 
group of countries (WTO, 2013). 
Table 1- Natural Resource Rents in ASEAN (as GDP %) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
Brunei 65.31 59.38 71.83 45,57 45.42 42.44 35.99 52.28 
Cambodia 2.72 2.67 3.88 3.39 3.85 4.29 4.59 3.63 
Indonesia 14.13 13.87 15.91 8.38 8.45 8.9 7.13 10.97 
Lao PDR 16.28 15.13 16.91 14.62 18.55 20.78 19.5 17.4 
Malaysia 18.53 16.61 19.68 11.61 10.77 10.82 9.8 13.97 
Philippines 2.78 5.06 3.08 2.76 3.9 4.42 3.5 3.64 
Thailand 5.64 5.38 7.42 4.28 4.29 4.5 4.31 5.12 
Vietnam 15.97 15.33 18.21 10.09 11.73 13.37 11.78 13.78 
ASEAN 17.67 16.68 19.61 12.59 13.37 13.69 12.08 15.1 
Source: The World Bank 
This common characteristic of the ASEAN community raises the question of the 
regional vulnerability to suffer from the "resource curse". This concept makes 
reference to the paradox that countries and regions with abundance in natural wealth                
–particularly depletable resources like minerals, gas and oil-, tend to perform 
economically worse than resource-poor countries. In this sense, many studies have 
focussed on the causes leading to this phenomenon and the impact they have on the 
economic and social development of these states (Singer, 1950, 1975; Nurske,1958; 
Sachs & Warner, 1995, 1999, 2001; Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999; Auty, 2001). The main 
                                                 
8
 Natural resource rents refers to the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents -hard and soft-, 
mineral rents, and forest rents (The World Bank). 
9
 Note that there was no data available for Myanmar. 
10
 The average percentage of total natural resource rents during the period 2002-2012 was 53% for 
Brunei Darussalam, 14% for Lao PDR and Malaysia, 13% for Vietnam and 11% for Cambodia. For 
Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines natural resources accounted for less than 5% of their GDP. 
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findings point towards the importance of a well-planned political economy and good 
governance (Sovacool, 2010: 234).  
Taking all the above into consideration, due to the growing geopolitical importance of 
the region and the importance that natural resources have for the domestic economy 
of these countries, this dissertation wants to study ASEAN's vulnerability to 
experience the resource curse, not only by focussing on the regional perspective but 
also on a country to country basis. 
Therefore, the first part of the paper focuses on exploring the previous literature on 
the resource curse, analysing different definitions and the causes associated to this 
phenomenon. Afterwards, departing from these assumptions, the research moves on 
establishing a series of hypotheses and comparing different statistical data to refute 
them.11 
 
1.2. Research Question 
Are the resource-rich countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) heading towards the resource curse? 
 
1.3. Objectives 
1.3.1 General Objective 
The aim of this paper is to assess the regional situation of ASEAN with regards to the 
resource curse, identifying the areas that have progressed the most, as well as those 
that present the greatest weaknesses.  
 
1.3.1. Specific Objectives 
1) Evaluate the general panorama of the region in the context of the resource curse 
by assessing the current situation of the areas of governance more closely related to 
this phenomenon. 
                                                 
11
 The origin and characteristic of the data will be specified later on in the paper. 
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2) Identify sector-specific strengths and weaknesses. 
3) Compare the regional situation with the domestic situation of ASEAN's member 
states. 
 
1.4. Justification 
The drivers for this research rest in various different issues that emphasise the 
importance of exploring the vulnerability of ASEAN with respect to the region’s risks 
to suffer from the resource curse. 
First of all, the growing political and economic importance of the region, 
characterised by rapid economic growth, big population, strategic location and 
natural wealth, underlines the necessity to assure its sustainable development. 
Another relevant point derives from its fast development pace. This prompt growth 
without an appropriate governmental management brings along big challenges to 
transform economic revenues into real human development and welfare.  
In addition, a good knowledge of the current panorama is the basis to find solutions 
and design new political and legal strategies to solve the problems arising from the 
resource curse, thus impeding a further worsening of the situation.  
Finally, contributing to a greater understanding of this research topic could serve to 
expand these findings to other similar neighbouring regions. 
 
1.4.1. Importance 
The relevance of this study rests essentially in the necessity to promote political 
stability in Southeast Asia due to its geopolitical weight. Instability in ASEAN 
countries would be counter-productive for the whole of Asia, as this region has 
emerged as a crucial counterbalancing power in the continent, mainly due to the 
economic and security ties forged with other big regional actors like China and 
Japan. Likewise political and economic uncertainty in the region would have a 
negative impact in global trade, as ASEAN constitutes a very important trade market. 
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Furthermore, Southeast Asian countries have become important competitors to other 
Asian players like China or India, serving as alternative suppliers of raw materials 
and manufactured goods, hence promoting price stability in the international markets.   
In this sense, this research seeks not only to deepen general knowledge about 
macroeconomic and political problems arising from the trade of mineral resources, 
but also to try assessing where the main risks and weaknesses rest, in order to help 
policy-makers find suitable solutions to tackle the issue. 
Moreover, regardless of the existence of many studies concerning the resource 
curse, there is no single theory that is able to explain on a general basis the fully 
implications and causes that lead to it. The main reason behind it is the complexity to 
understand the fundamentals of sustainable development. In this sense, although 
different disciplines from the social sciences have agreed on the relationship 
between the resource curse and good governance, economic growth and human 
development, scholars have not so far been able to fully agree on what these terms 
imply and how they interrelate. Likewise there is no consensus on how factors such 
as culture impact them. Therefore, further research on the topic is pertinent to 
contribute to a better understanding of the issue. 
 
1.4.2. Originality 
This research project is not a mere continuation of previous works on the impact of 
the resource curse in Southeast Asia. It opens a new research frame by exploring 
new variables –more countries and more indicators. 
Another original aspect of this project relies on its methodology. In this respect, in 
contrast with previous studies concerning the resource curse in the region, this 
research uses aggregate indicators. This allows to summarise a complex array of 
information in a simplify manner taking into account a wider range of data that other 
measurements cannot take into consideration. In addition, the values that are to be 
used to quantify different governance aspects come from different sources, 
minimising bias interpretation of data, thus producing more objective findings. 
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1.4.3. Scientific and practical contribution 
From the scientific perspective, the main contribution of this paper lays on the 
research methodology. The introduction of aggregate indicators to analyse the 
phenomenon of the resource curse opens the door to establish a new framework for 
the study of this matter. Data used in previous works on the issue originated from a 
single source. The new approach proposed in this project, bases its analysis on 
indicators whose data derives from the compilation of different statistical 
measurements, which despite originating in different sources, follow similar 
methodologies. This allows elaborating better conclusions as contrasting variables 
are more complete.    
With respects to the practical contribution, the assessment of the current situation in 
ASEAN regarding the resource curse could be very useful in the design of new 
regional and domestic policies to further combat this issue. This is of especial 
importance, as the region´s prospects suggest a greater economic role of its natural 
fuels and mining reserves12. In this context, a deeper understanding of the risks and 
areas of greater exposition is necessary to promote a more responsible regional 
agenda on this matter.  
 
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
In general terms, this research is based on a quantitative analysis that departs from 
an analytical overview on the researched issue to then develop a comparative 
research.  
 
2.1 Gathering of information 
The main sources consulted for the gathering of the statistical information used to 
                                                 
12
 With concerns to natural fuels, ASEAN´s prospects to become the “Persian Gulf of Gas” indicates 
the increasing role that this resource is expected to have on these countries’ economies (International 
Energy Agency, 2013: 11). Likewise, the huge reserves of coal, gold, rare earths and other strategic 
minerals together with their increasing markets suggest, that the trade of this commodities will become 
an important source of revenues for the region.  
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develop the comparative research were the World Bank and United Nations. These 
two institutions offer different statistical databases providing data from primary 
sources. 
Due to the conception of this research, it is necessary to emphasise that the 
investigation is based on the comparison of aggregate indicators. This term refers to 
composite measures based on a large number of underlying sources.  
In this context, it is important to differentiate between the statistical data measuring 
the GDP, natural resource rents and Human Development Index –HDI-, and the data 
referring to political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption and voice & accountability. 
Although in all cases the data originated from different aggregate indicators, the 
origin of the statistics for the first group -GDP, natural resource rents and HDI- rest in 
the sole work of the World Bank and the United Nations Organisation. These two 
bodies have been in charge of collecting the information and have delivered it in the 
shape of concrete indicators and indexes. However, in the case of the indicators 
used to explore the political dimension of the resource curse -political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control 
of corruption and voice & accountability-, the origin of the statistical data comes from 
different indexes that share similar methodology and that have been processed 
afterwards by the World Bank Institute.13 This institution has compiled all this 
information, rescaled it and produced new statistical measures. The result of this 
process is the Worldwide Governance Indicators -WGI.  
In the WGI country reports, the World Bank Institute has rescaled each single 
indicator to run from 0 –low- to 1 -high. Nonetheless, this data is displayed only in 
two ways: as percentile ranks indicating the percentage of countries worldwide that 
rank lower than the studied country; or in the form of rescaled raw data (not 
compiled), classified by source of origin. In this sense, this research has made used 
of the rescaled raw data, calculating the average value for every year during the 
                                                 
13
 See Tables 14 to 25 in Annex II to understand the sources from which the each aggregate indicator 
has been calculated. 
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period 2006-2012, for each country and for the six political indicators.14 In addition, to 
facilitate its contextualisation, the annually average measurements have been 
transformed into a percentile that encloses the information as follows: the lower the 
percentage, the worse the quality of the governance it is and vice versa.15 
 
2.2 Variables 
This research is based on the comparison of the performance of two different study 
groups: ASEAN’s resource-rich countries and OPEC’s top nine countries with greater 
oil rents. On the one hand, the study group made up of the Southeast Asian nations 
will be analysed both as a regional unit as well as on a country to country basis. On 
the other hand, the group composed by some of OPEC’s member states will act as 
the control group. 
To proceed with the comparison of these two groups, the paper focuses on nine 
different variables reassembling the economic, political and social dimensions related 
to the resource curse (see Table 2). 
Table 2- Research variables 
                                                 
14
 The countries studied are the nine resource-rich countries of ASEAN and OPEC’s top nine oil 
exporters.  
15
 See Tables 4 to 12 in  Annex I for more concrete information. 
Economic Dimension 
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
 Natural Resource Rents 
Political Dimension 
 Political stability & absence of 
violence 
 Government effectiveness 
 Regulatory quality 
 Rule of law 
 Control of corruption 
 Voice and accountability 
Social Dimension  Human Development Index 
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The two economic variables are Gross Domestic Product and Natural Resource 
Rents. The former indicator reflects the economic performance of the region, 
whereas the later measurement serves to establish the impact of natural resources in 
the economy. 
The political variables focus on the main aspects related to good governance: 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, control of corruption and voice & accountability (United Nations 
Human Rights). 
Lastly, the variable concerning the social dimension is represented by the Human 
Development Index. A composite indicator that measures different issues such as life 
expectancy, literacy, GNI per capita, inequality, poverty, gender equality and 
sustainability within others (United Nations Development Programme). 
 
2.3 Methodology 
As it has been exposed, this quantitative study departs from an analytical 
examination of the issue, and follows with a comparative research based on 
statistical data originating on primary sources. 
To start with, the paper will revise pre-existing literature to explore the fundamentals 
of the resource curse, focusing on exploring its causes and the risks associated with 
this phenomenon.  
Then, after all the necessary statistical data is been compiled, the analysis will 
proceed by firstly studying current trends in ASEAN, which would a posteriori be 
contrasted with the trends experienced by the countries making up the control group. 
To do so, the data will be transformed into graphs to facilitate the visual comparison. 
Finally, each of the variables will be analysed country by country by comparing them 
with ASEAN’s regional trends, as well as to the tendencies showed by OPEC. 
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3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
3.1 Previous literature 
During the last decades many scholars have discussed the impact that mineral 
resources have on the development of the countries that possesses them. The neo-
classical tradition has always stated that the discovery and exploitation of this natural 
wealth is linked with the economic growth of a country, establishing a direct positive 
connection between resources and development (Davis & Tilton, 2005).  
In this sense, resource-rich countries are expected to perform economically better 
than resource-poor countries, as the former hold an extra competitive advantage 
when compared with the latter. However, empirical data show a different story. 
Countries like Singapore, South Korea or Taiwan have experienced an 
unprecedented economic development despite their scarce possession of natural 
resources (Auty, 2001). 
Furthermore, the account of many resource-abundant states has produced a very 
different narrative. Regardless of their inherent wealth, countries like Nigeria, Congo, 
Venezuela or Peru serve as evidence to prove that the ownership of raw materials do 
not imply economic success nor social and economic development.  
Hence, during the second half of the XX century many scholars have criticised this 
association, arguing that there is a negative correlation between the two factors 
(Singer, 1950, 1975; Nurske,1958; Sachs & Warner, 1995, 1999, 2001; Karl, 1997; 
Ross, 1999; Auty, 2001).  
As a result of these two different lines of thought, a big debate has emerged 
concerning this issue. On the one hand, the traditional position defends that in mining 
economies the natural capital can be transformed into other forms of capital such as 
physical, human, institutional and knowledge. In this sense, this argument upholds 
that the more natural resources a country has, the greater the output it can produced, 
thus the higher is per capita income should be expected to be. This would eventually 
lead to the generation of wealth that would in return revert in that nation, contributing 
to its economic growth and development. On the other hand, recent events in many 
developing countries all around the globe, suggest that this expected behaviour is not 
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necessary the real outcome of resource-rich countries. Therefore, the alternative 
view suggests that there are clear evidences to associate mining with slower 
economic growth (Davis & Tilton, 2005).  
In this respect, some authors like Sachs and Warner (1995; 1999; 2001) have carried 
out different empirical researches in which they have explored the effect of different 
determinants of economic growth in the development process. With a special focus 
on the influence exerted by mining dependency in the economy of different countries, 
their findings have proven the existence of a negative correlation between mineral 
resources and economic development. This has shown that the greater the 
dependency on the mining sector, the slower the economic growth is.16  
These studies have served as the departing point to consider the existence of a 
negative causal relationship between natural resources and economic growth. In this 
context, many different explanations have arisen not only in economic terms, but also 
politically and socially. 
The first economic ideas on the matter go back to the period after World War II, when 
many structuralists questioned the developmental strategy that was being foster in 
many states. This plan was mainly based on the international trading of natural 
resources. Regardless of the traditionally assumptions enclose on these kinds of 
policies, these scholars argued that these economic strategies would be strongly 
affected by two macroeconomic conditions inherited by the markets: declining terms 
of trade, and volatility of international markets. Furthermore, they expressed their 
concerns about how dependency on one economic sector would impede the 
stimulation of other sectors, consequently hindering the economic boom of these 
countries (Ross, 1999: 301).  
With regards to declining terms of trade, the main claim was that this phenomenon is 
the expected result from two interrelated processes. For one thing, prices of mineral 
commodities would tend to fall as market competition increases, hence leading 
towards declining terms of trade. Meanwhile, the initial betterment of the economy 
resultant from the mineral trade, would lead to an increase in the domestic demand 
of other products. Yet, as the economy specialises in the trading of those natural 
                                                 
16
 At least this is so in all the cases studied and compared in their research. 
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resources, the internal production would not meet the domestic demand of other 
goods leading to the growth of imports. In return this would augment the national 
sovereign debt, as well as the gap between the rich industrialised countries and the 
mineral economy (Singer, 1975). However, despite the fact that several studies about 
the impact of this matter in the economic growth have concluded that indeed prices 
of primary commodity tend to fall after a period of time, these investigations are 
considered valid on a global basis but are still vague to be used at the case-study 
level (Ross, 1999: 304). 
Another characteristic linked to resource-based economic growth identified by the 
structuralists is volatile markets resultant from fluctuations in international demand. 
The outcome of this process leads to booms and recessions (Nurske, 1958), causing 
economic distress in the developing economies, promoting instability and affecting 
the policy-making process (Karl, 1997: 7) 
Likewise, the experts also refer to the impact that natural resource wealth has on the 
rest of the economy. With this concern, scholars classify mining exploitation as an 
enclave activity, concentrating all the investments and leading them away from other 
economic sectors. The main outcome of this situation is the inability to diversify the 
domestic economy. As a consequence, imports of other goods increase, contributing 
to enhancing the problems related to declining terms of trade (Davis & Tilton, 
2005).17  
One more traditional economic effect that has been related to the resource curse is 
the Dutch Disease. This term refers to the abnormal, unsustainable and distorted 
economic growth of a country resultant from the rapid expansion of one economic 
sector in detriment of another sector of the economy (Karl, 1997: 5-6, 26-30). This 
phenomenon is related to two different effects: on the one hand, the growth of 
exports leads to the appreciation of the real exchange rate; on the other hand, due to 
the boom around the trading of this commodity, economic activities and investment 
tend to be moved away from manufacturing and agriculture, reallocating them in the 
resource sector. The main outcome of these two processes is a decrease in the 
export of agricultural commodities and manufactured goods. This translates in rising 
                                                 
17
 Hence, this serves to understand the process related to declining terms of trade. 
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prices of those products and services that are unable to be imported (Davis & Tilton, 
2005). Nonetheless, researchers on this field have not been able to establish any 
concrete linkages between export instability and the resource curse, only managing 
to prove the impact of unstable exports on the overall economy from a general 
perspective (Ross, 1999: 304).  
Other radical arguments speak of the role of foreign actors and the global power 
structures. Concretely they refer to the inequalities emerging from the capitalist 
system, arguing that the interests of the developing countries are subordinated in 
favour of the rich and well-developed countries (Rosser, 2006) 
In political and social terms, scholars have focussed mainly on three aspects to 
explain the existence of the resource curse: decision-making choices, social aspects 
shaping state behaviour and pre-established socio-political and economic structures 
and their impact in political institutions (Ross, 1999: 305-319).  
In the same way as the economic academics defend, revenues from resource booms 
might result in unsustainable development as economic policies might not been able 
to tackle negative outcomes related to the trading of mineral resources. However, the 
political explanation focuses on how the economic dependency upon a leading 
economic sector determines tax structures, institutions and other factors related to 
economic planning, impeding the diversification of the economy (Karl, 1997: 12-13).  
Also, the initial betterment of the economy, resultant from the trade of the natural 
resource, tends to produce a boom in state expenditure, especially concerning public 
investments in infrastructure and employment creation. Yet, increasing dependency 
towards the extractive sector and the state-led economy persuades further economic 
restructuration promoting rent-seeking behaviours. This blurs the distinction between 
the political and economic role of the state, exacerbating institutional decay (Karl, 
1997; Rosser, 2006).  
Another proposed argument relates to wealth concentration patterns and 
maintenance of the status quo. In mining economies, revenues from this economic 
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sector normally go to the State.18 Consequently, wealth is highly concentrated, 
establishing a strong linkage between power and plenty. This translates into the 
stagnation of the political process, as the policy environment does not provide with 
creative and alternative solutions to solve problems. In addition it also contributes to 
increase the role of the government in the economy. This hinders the 
competitiveness of the State, further reducing the possibilities to reform the economic 
system (Karl, 1997: 15, 93). Similarly, the accumulation of power determines the 
structuration of social and other organised interests, as well as the patterns for 
collective actions. All this accentuates disparities between the rural and urban areas, 
promotes further rent-seeking behaviour and a decline in the quality of institutions. 
Sometimes it also produces social unrest (Davis & Tilton, 2005). 
A further political explanation of the origin of resource curse, speaks of the role and 
quality of the domestic institutions of a state.  
Some authors depart from the assumption that economic development is the result of 
institutional changes. In this context the concept of structuration of choice emerges to 
explain how dependency on an export commodity leads to social and political 
transformation, that through the remodelling and emergence of institutions have a 
direct impact on decision-making processes. This transformation takes place as the 
system is reshaped to compile with the needs of the commodity industry. In 
exchange, this limits and determines the way political decisions are made (Karl, 
1997: 6-11).  
It is also important to emphasise, that several different aspects constrain choices: 
changes in notions of property rights derived from the nationalisation of companies 
related to the strategic commodity; influences of interests groups and organisations; 
competition between state and market forces; and pre-existing socio-politico 
structures containing subjective rules of conduct. All these factors have also a direct 
impact in the behaviour of the state which, as it was exposed before, is also 
determined by the preferences of individual policymakers. In point of fact, specialists 
                                                 
18
 The high-input feature of the industry, require a big initial investment which originally means that the 
sector is initially controlled by foreign companies. In turn, to try to obtain as much benefit as possible 
from them, the governments tend to impose high taxes on them or nationalise them after a while. As a 
consequence, the revenues from this sector are usually managed by the State. 
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point out that pre-established socio-political and economic structures create a 
concrete institutional legacy that construct and reduces the range of choices. These 
path-dependencies create “critical junctures” that reinforce the initial choices (Karl, 
1997:10-18).19 
One more state-centred approach focusses on the pre-existing features of the 
political institutions, establishing a direct connection between the resource curse and 
“grabble-friendly” institutions (Mehlum et al., 2002). In this sense, authors defend that 
when institutions are more prone to grab instead of produce, the risk of suffering the 
resource curse is greater (Mehlum et al., 2002). 
Undoubtedly all these findings prove that the role of political economy and 
governance is crucial in the understanding of the resource curse (Sovacool, 2010: 
234).  
In this context, Sovacool (2010) explored the situation of the resource curse in 
Southeast Asia. For his research, the scholar chose to compare thirteen different 
economic, political and social indicators from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar 
and Thailand with similar indicators from two different control groups: OPEC’s top five 
oil producers and the BRICS. The paper concluded with positive remarks on the 
overall situation of the Asian countries on the issue of the resource curse. 
To conclude with, the literature concerning this socio-political and economic 
phenomenon underlines that the reasons behind the resource curse are varied. 
Some authors have focused more on the economic aspects related to the trade of 
natural resources and dependency upon an economic sector; other scholars have 
centred on how the possession of natural resources shapes the socio-political 
panorama of a country. All these different aspects of the resource curse suggest that 
mineral wealth represents an opportunity for countries to boost their development but 
that depending on the governance quality and the policy decisions, it can become a 
blessing or a curse (Davis & Tilton, 2005). 
 
                                                 
19
 The concept “critical junctions” refers to the idea that path dependency leads to a series of choices 
that lead to a certain institutional development and are very difficult to be reversed. 
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3.2 The Hypothesis: proposed model 
Taking into account the previous literature on the resource curse, it can be concluded 
that the main factors behind the resource curse are the possession of mineral 
endorsement and lack of good governance.20 According to this logic, the main 
common feature to all countries suffering from the resource curse is their 
dependency on the mineral sector. In this sense, the greater the economic 
importance of the extractive sector the greater the risk to suffer from the resource 
curse should be.  
Departing from this assumption, this research paper wants to find an answer to the 
question “are the resource-rich countries of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations –ASEAN- heading towards the resource curse?” To do so, this study will 
firstly compare the average regional results of ASEAN’s resource-rich countries with 
those of OPEC’s main oil exporters.21 Afterwards it will continue analysing the results 
on a country to country basis, delving into their individual developments as well as 
contrasting them with the regional progress on the issue. 
The countries conforming Southeast Asia’s group are those possessing important 
mineral endowments.22 In this sense, from the ten countries conforming ASEAN, nine 
of them would correspond to that definition: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.23  
                                                 
20
 Despite a universal definition of this concept, the resolution 2000/64 passed by United Nations’ 
Commission on Human Rights, establishes that the key features of “good governance” are: 
transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and responsiveness. This resolution 
establishes these attributes as crucial to create an enabling environment to promote growth and 
human development (United Nations Human Rights). 
21
 The selection of OPEC’s countries is based on the importance that the mineral sector have on their 
economies. This particular feature should be related to their overall development capacity. Therefore 
comparing their trajectories with those of ASEAN can bring a clear understanding of the overall 
situation one in the Southeast Asian countries. 
22
 The selection has been based on the composition of ASEAN Senior Official Meeting on Minerals –
ASOMM (ASEAN Mineral Database and Information System). 
23
 Due to the resource-poor nature of Singapore, this paper has not included it as part of ASEAN’s 
control group. 
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The contrasting control group has been built up based on OPEC’s top nine countries 
with bigger oil rents: Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia 
and Venezuela (see Table 3). The selection of these countries has been based on 
the fact that despite their enormous endorsements of oil, due to their dependency on 
this sector, countries belonging to this group have experienced very slow 
development, proving that they have not being able to transform the revenues 
proceeding from the trade of the black gold into real successful development. This 
places these countries as optimal paradigms to be compared with other groups, as 
they constitute a benchmark that serves to assess the progresses on the avoidance 
of the resource curse. 
Table 3- OPEC Member States ranked by oil rents (as GDP %) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
Iraq 92.5 84 85.4 70.6 73.6 77.7 80.63 
Angola 62.6 58.7 70.7 44.3 46.6 46.3 54.87 
Saudi 
Arabia 
56.7 55.5 64.3 43.6 47.2 55.5 53.8 
Libya 62.9 52.1 56.7 42.3 - - 53.5 
Kuwait 57.4 54.5 60.7 42.6 48.3 49.9 52.23 
Iran 40.3 35 39.9 23.5 - - 34.68 
Nigeria 33.2 29.6 31.3 22.5 25.1 32.9 29.1 
Venezuela 39.5 30.7 31.7 17.3 18.3 30 27.9 
Ecuador 27.4 26.4 30.2 17.2 20.4 25.6 24.53 
UAE 23.4 21.9 25.1 14.9 18.4 21.9 20.93 
Algeria 23.1 22 23.1 15.5 16.9 19 19.93 
Qatar 27.6 22.4 22.7 13.5 14.6 14.4 19.2 
Source: The World Bank, 2014 
To update previous regional research on the matter, the time frame selected to be 
assessed goes from 2006 to 2012. For that reason, statistical data for each indicator 
will be organised around each year conforming the study period.24 
In order to measure their susceptibility with respect to the resource curse, different 
indicators from the economic, political and social dimensions should be measured. In 
                                                 
24
 Please note that the statistics from the Human Development Index, United Nations does not release 
the reports on a strict annual basis. Therefore although the results will indeed cover the same study 
period they will not be organised on a yearly basis. Nonetheless this should not affect anyhow the 
results as the research focuses on the trends. 
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this sense, taking into account previous works done on the matter, this paper will 
focus on the analysis of nine aggregated indicators: GDP and natural resource rents 
within the economic dimensions; in the political dimension political stability & 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control 
of corruption and voice and accountability; and finally in the social dimension human 
development.  
In this context, the proposed hypotheses are: 
1) If on average, economic growth slows down and natural resource rents show 
an increasing trend while the indicators for the social and political dimensions 
show negative trend, ASEAN is heading towards the resource curse. 
2) If on average, ASEAN’s natural resource rents surpass that of the control 
group while the social and political indicators’ performance fall behind that of 
the control group, ASEAN is heading towards the resource curse. 
3) If on an individual basis, ASEAN member states show slower economic 
growth and an increasing role of their natural resource rents while political and 
social indicators reveal signs of decline, the risks for that country to suffer from 
the resource curse increase. 
For the first hypothesis to be confirmed, one should presume to see a worsening on 
the average score of these indicators except in the case of natural resource rents, 
which should be expected to increase over time. In this sense, for the period 2006-
2012, natural resource rents should be expected to progressively become more 
present in the domestic economies of the selected countries, impacting the growth of 
their GDP. On the contrary, during the same period of time political transparency, 
voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, government effectiveness 
and political stability should be expected to decrease underlying a worsening of the 
governance quality. Similarly, measurements of human development should be 
expected to show no positive changes. 
Likewise, for the second hypothesis to be verified, one should expect for the 
Southeast Asian group to exceed the control group’s average in terms of natural 
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resource rents while scoring below on the indicators referring to the political and 
social dimensions. 
Equally, for the remaining hypothesis to be confirmed, one should anticipate to see 
that the individual country on examination presents higher natural resource rents 
than that of the regional average impacting the growth of the GDP. On the contrary, 
trends in political transparency, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, government effectiveness and political stability should be expected to show a 
decline underlying a worsening of the governance quality. In the same way, 
measurements of human development should be expected to show lower scores. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses comparison and result analysis  
Opposite to what it should had been expected if the first hypothesis was to be 
refuted, the average regional results showed signs of the contrary, suggesting that on 
a regional basis ASEAN is managing to overcome the risks to suffer from the 
resource curse (see Figure I).25 
While positive economic growth characterised ASEAN’s economies, the rents 
originating from natural resources still play a relative small role in the region’s GDP.26 
Departing from the assumption that output tends to increase over time due to the 
technical characteristics of the extractive industry, and taking into account the natural 
wealth that Southeast Asian countries have, these results suggest that on a regional 
basis, the risk of economic dependency on the mining sector is small. However, 
before the global economic crisis, revenues originating from the trading of natural 
resources had a greater role in the regional economy. This fact should not be 
neglected, as international economic recovery could once more generate boom in 
this sector, increasing the risks for the economy dependency on this sector. 
                                                 
25
 It is important to point out that fluctuations in the data related to the effects of the global financial 
crisis have been overlooked as these fluctuations were probably the result of the global economic and 
financial instability. This assumption is based on the fact that if the worsening of the situation had a 
domestic origin, the situation should have continued to worsen. However, the trends prove contrary, 
hence suggesting that the poorer results were the outcome of the global economic shock.  
26
 Note that there is no data available for Myanmar, hence for this indicator, the regional average has 
been calculated based on eight countries. 
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Likewise, contrary to what it should had been expected, results of the political 
dimensions show optimistic developments. In five out of the six indicators explored, 
the outcomes reflect a steady positive trend. The biggest improvements were 
recorded in the indicators referring to political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law 
and voice & accountability. These four political areas show stable and smooth 
improvements suggesting the implementation of beneficial institutional, administrative 
and political reforms. With respect to government effectiveness and control of 
corruption, results are slightly more erratic. Nevertheless overall, they also show a 
positive trend.  
In this context, it is of especial relevance, the advancements made after the global 
financial crisis. Despite international market instability and market volatility, statistics 
reveal that ASEAN’s policy-making and institutions have been able to overcome 
these difficulties. This reflects that the global economic shock has served to improve 
governance on an average regional basis.  
On the other hand, the results exposed by the Human Development Index (HDI) are 
not conclusive to determine if ASEAN countries are successfully transforming their 
economic growth into overall development, especially when analysing the latest 
results. Despite the fact that lower outcomes in 2010 could be attributed to the 
modifications implemented in that years’ HDI report, the outcome of the previous 
year presents already a lower score than in the previous reports.  
A possible explanation could be founded on the fact that developmental policies in 
many of the ASEAN countries are funded with money proceeding from Official 
Development Assistance –ODA- programmes. Due to the global financial crisis, the 
amount of ODA was significantly reduced so that many projects were ceased or 
stopped; hence diminishing the impact and outreach of these policies which was 
reflect on the results of the Human Development Index reports. If this assumption 
was to be correct, this would imply that ASEAN’s regional policies to promote 
development are still too dependent on foreign assistance, suggesting that despite 
important improvements, the region still needs to reinforce the shared mechanisms 
and institutions that focus on this issue.  
Another conceivable explanation derived from the region’s recent history, marked by 
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genocide, multiple wars and several dictatorship and even isolationist governments. 
These events devastated these countries, complicating the promotion of human 
development. Thus this must indeed be reflected in the statistical data. 
Taking the above into consideration, the tendencies reflected in the analysis of the 
different dimensions, suggest optimistic regional developments in the prevention of 
the resource curse. Yet, to get a better understanding of the real implications of these 
results, they should be contrasted with the control group: OPEC’s top nine countries 
with high natural resource rents (see Figure II).  
When comparing both regions, performance trends in each of the indicators show 
slight differences. 
In the economic indicators -economic growth and natural resource rents-, OPEC’s 
results reflect more erratic outcomes. In the context of the resource curse, one of the 
main problems associated to this phenomenon is slower economic growth. Even 
though the economic performance of OPEC’s countries still shows economic growth, 
the erratic results indicate their higher regional vulnerability with respect to the 
resource curse. Similarly, the patterns presented by the natural resource rents, 
reveal that this natural wealth plays a crucial role in the regional average GDP. This 
corroborates the previous assumption on the reasons for the irregular economic 
performance. In this sense, ASEAN’s more stable economic trends and lower 
involvement of the mining sector in the region’s GDP imply less vulnerability to the 
resource curse. 
Similar to what the economic patterns suggest, the outcomes of the six political 
indicators confirm important differences between the two regions. On one side, while 
the Southeast Asian region displays positive trends on a general basis, the OPEC 
mainly present signs of stagnation or very little improvement. This suggests that in 
ASEAN, the political process is concentrating on renovating and adapting institutions, 
administration and policy-making processes, whereas in the OPEC advancements in 
this matters are almost non-existent. On the other side, on a general basis, ASEAN’s 
performance is better than that of the OPEC countries. In four of the six indicators -
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law-, the 
results of the Asian region outperform those of the control group. Moreover, in the  
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two remaining indicators -control of corruption and voice & accountability-,despite 
initial lower results, recent outcomes have surpassed those of the OPEC. 
Trends concerning the Human Development Index, announce less optimistic 
developments for the Southeast Asian region. This issue is very significant when 
determining the ASEAN’ capacity to transform economic revenues into real 
development, especially as this matter is closely related to the effects derived from 
suffering the resource curse. The bigger the success in transforming economic 
growth into real development, the less prone the region is to suffer from the resource 
curse. In this sense, ASEAN countries present bigger differences than those of the 
OPEC. This suggests less efficiency in policies aiming to foment social development. 
Comparing these results to the second proposed hypothesis -“if on average, 
ASEAN’s natural resource rents surpass that of the control group while the social and 
political indicators’ performance fall behind that of the control group, ASEAN is 
heading towards the resource curse”-, it can be establish that overall on a regional 
average basis, the performance of the Southeast Asian countries suggest that the 
region is avoiding the resource curse. 
On a regional level, the results and patterns show a steady improvement in the areas 
explored, suggesting that ASEAN is working on its institutional empowerment, 
administrative efficiency and social justice. Nevertheless, on a country to country 
basis the results defer from the regional perception. Therefore a deeper analysis is 
needed to understand and explore the risks arising from the economic exploitation of 
their natural wealth. 
In terms of economic growth (see Figure III) there are important differences between 
the countries of the region.27 Only Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR and Vietnam tend 
to perform economically above the region’s average, whereas the economic growth 
of Brunei and Thailand is slower than ASEAN’s average. Isolated, this indicator does 
not reveal anything relevant to assess the current situation with respect to the 
resource curse. Yet as many studies have proven, one of the motives related to 
slower economic growth is economic dependency on the mining sector. 
Consequently, when this indicator is compared with the impact that natural resource  
                                                 
27
 Note that there was no data available for Myanmar. 
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rents have on these countries (see Figure IV), the outcomes are more significant. In 
this sense, the case of Brunei stands out. Results for this country reveal that the 
bigger the relevance of the natural resources in the economy, the slower the 
economic growth is. This unveils the great dependency that the country has on its 
natural wealth, a factor crucial to determine the degree to which a country is prone to 
suffer from the resource curse. 
 In reference to the Human Development Index, trends show important divergences 
(see Figure V). Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand perform above both the 
Southeast Asian and OPEC’s regional averages. The results of Indonesia and 
Vietnam are within the region’s average, while Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar 
got lower scores.   
With regards to political stability and absence of violence, when ASEAN countries are 
compared individually with the regional average, some points are to be mentioned 
(see Figure VI). The case of Thailand is of particular importance. This country not 
only scores below the regional average but also show a recent tendency towards 
increased instability and violence. Likewise, Thailand’s results in this indicator are 
pessimistic when compared to the OPEC’s average. Other countries presenting poor 
scores on this dimension when compared both with ASEAN and OPEC are 
Indonesia, Philippines and Myanmar. Yet, their trend seems more optimistic with a 
steady improvement of the overall situation. The rest of the ASEAN member states 
show better performances. 
One of the dimensions in which result differ the greatest is government effectiveness 
(see Figure VII). In this particular aggregate indicator, only three countries –Brunei, 
Malaysia and Vietnam- performed above ASEAN’s average throughout the whole 
study period. The performances of Indonesia, Lao PDR and Thailand were very 
similar scoring values similar to the regional average. Nonetheless, in the cases of 
Cambodia and Myanmar, the results seem optimistic as they show a relatively steady 
improvement. On the other hand, when domestic results are compared with those of 
the OPEC group, Myanmar and Philippines are the only Southeast Asian countries 
presenting an inferior performance. 
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There are also significant differences in the scores concerning regulatory quality (see 
Figure VIII). Once more the results from Myanmar rest lower than ASEAN’s regional 
records. The general trend is positive with only Malaysia and Lao PDR presenting a 
decline in their figures, and Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam showing signs of 
stagnation. When these meters are contrasted with the OPEC’s results, similar 
patterns appear. 
The outcomes concerning rule of law present further divergences (see Figure IX). On 
the one hand, Myanmar, Cambodia and Lao PDR continue to score below the rest of 
their regional group. Furthermore, despite initial positive trends, Vietnam has been 
unable to perform as good as the other countries of the region since 2009. On the 
other hand, all countries seem to present improvements on this political dimension, 
indicating an improvement in their judicial system. Nevertheless, with the exception 
of Brunei, no other studied country has scored above 60%. Similarly the regional 
average is still below 50% of the total score it could achieve. This proves that 
significant changes in the judicial apparatus are still needed. In this context, when 
these outcomes are compared with the OPEC, Myanmar and Cambodia continue to 
get lower scores. This fact emphasises that within this political factor, these two 
states present the greatest risks of being unable to counteract the threats derived 
from the resource curse.  
One of the most relevant political aspects of the resource curse is corruption. Despite 
performing above the regional average, it is of relevance to point out that the latest 
scores of Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam show a negative trend. 
Conversely, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, give the opposite account, although 
they present very poor scores. Equally, when contrasted with the OPEC group, these 
three countries continue to score below them. Nevertheless, they show a positive 
tendency, indicating certain advancement in promoting transparency.  
Another indicator presenting important differences is voice and accountability (see 
Figure XI). With the exception of Vietnam which has significantly deteriorated, 
ASEAN member states show positive trends. Within this context, there are still 
enormous differences. Myanmar and Lao score below the regional average, 
presenting both countries an optimistic trend. Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia 
lead with the best meters, but they show stagnation or deterioration of their results.  
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In the same way, the comparison with the OPEC shows similar developments. 
Vietnam, Lao and Myanmar keep on scoring below the group’s average proving to be 
the countries where voice and accountability still needs to develop significantly. It is 
of especial importance the case of Vietnam, as even with signs of recovery its 
performance is still considerably below to the country’s 2009 values. 
Taking the above results into account and applying them to refute the third 
hypothesis, the outcomes produced reveal different conclusions.  
One of the cases that stand out is Brunei. The outcomes reflect that the domestic 
economy of this country is highly dependent on its extractive industry. Nonetheless, 
the other indicators prove that regardless of this dependency, the country has 
already achieved a high level of development. Hence, signalling that this sultanate 
has been able to avoid the resource curse and managed to transformed its natural 
wealth into real human development. 
Other interesting results are shown by Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar. These 
three countries present poorer performances that those of its regional neighbours 
insinuating that they could be more prone to suffer from this political economy 
malaise. Yet, some important variances imply different susceptibility levels. In the 
Cambodian case, the extractive industry still plays a minimal role in the economy of 
the country and therefore it is unlikely that this sector would monopolised the 
domestic economy. The opposite situation seems to apply to Lao PDR. Trends 
suggest that natural resource rents are becoming increasingly more significant in the 
country’s economy. This fact combined with the other poorer results raises put 
forward that the risks for this country to suffer from the resource curse are relatively 
high. In the case of Myanmar the situation is less conclusive. Lack of economic data 
concerning the country’s natural resource rents complicates any assessment on the 
issue. Still, announcements of a renewed gold rush in the country,28 together with the 
recent infrastructural developments related to the oil and gas industry,29 suggest that 
                                                 
28
 After the Western nations lifted sanctions in Myanmar in 2012 and the country is progressively 
opening internationally, many international firms have moved there to try to get a piece of the market 
(Ghosh, 2012).  
29
 The ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2010-2015, adopted under the ASEAN 
Vision 2020, settled the basis for regional cooperation in energy-related matters. One of the main 
 38 
 
Myanmar’s extractive industry role and involvement in the country’s domestic 
economy is probably very important and will probably become even more crucial. In 
this sense, this could also bring important challenges to promote economic 
diversification and avoid the resource curse. 
With respect to the rest of the countries, their results do not suggest that the risks to 
suffer from the resource curse are high. Their slower development must be attributed 
to other economic, political and social factors. Thus it can be stated that despite their 
natural resource wealth they are managing to confront the risks of the resource 
curse. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Although traditional economic thought establishes a direct positive correlation 
between the possession of natural resources and economic growth and 
development, empirical examples have questioned the validity of this assumption. 
Concretely, this observation applies to countries with high dependency on their 
mining industry. This has led to the belief of the existence of a “resource curse”. 
In this context, experts from different disciplines have delved on the causes that 
impede certain resource-rich countries to transform their natural wealth into real 
human development. The findings have proposed different economic, political and 
social explanations.  
From the economic viewpoint, experts attribute the resource curse to five different 
causes: declining terms of trade; international market volatility; its function as an 
enclave activity; the Dutch Disease; and competing interests arising from the pre-
existing inequalities between the developed and the developing world.  
The political perspective has centred in three main ideas connecting the economic 
findings to political actions: dependency on the mining sector constrains decision-
making processes by reducing the amount of possible choices; state behaviour is 
                                                                                                                                                        
objectives emphasised in this plan is the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP). In this context, 
Myanmar has already concluded two cross-border pipelines and there is a third one under progress 
(ASEAN Centre for Energy, 2013. pp.27-37). 
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reshaped to adjust and satisfy the political requirements of the extractive industry; 
certain institutional characteristics contribute to the resource curse, whereas others 
minimise its impact. 
The social angle has proposed a different explanation that complements the political 
and economic views. According to these experts, different interest groups create 
concrete critical junctures that lead to a certain institutional development and are very 
difficult to be reversed. 
Departing from these ideas, this research paper has focused on exploring the current 
panorama in Southeast Asia, as this region constitutes an important economic and 
geopolitical area very rich in mineral resources.  
In this sense, the aim was to assess the regional risks and progresses in the context 
of the resource curse, building up and updating previous works on the issue. For this 
purpose, a total of nine economic, political and social aggregated indicators were 
analysed and contrasted with similar data from a control group formed by OPEC 
countries, for a study period of seven years (2006-2012). The results of the research 
have helped drawing different conclusions. 
In general, the economic, social and political trends experienced by ASEAN’s 
resource-rich countries, anticipate that all these areas of study are experiencing a 
relatively stable growth. These positive patterns suggest that prospective regional 
developments should be deemed optimistic.  
However, some evidences point towards certain areas where attention should be 
hold. Particularly, three indicators ask for caution: natural resource rents, control of 
corruption and human development index. Statistical data from these three matters 
show relatively negative performance.  
Regardless, of its current moderate economic importance, natural resource rents 
played a higher role in the region’s economy before the global financial crisis. This 
raises concerns about its re-emergence once the world fully recovers from the 
economic shock and its potential influence in driving the region towards the resource 
curse. 
Similarly, results regarding control of corruption still present very poor values. This 
increases ASEAN’s risks to experience the resource curse, as this political issue 
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foments institutional decay which would be reinforced by path dependency. 
Also very significant, the results of the human development index show that despite 
the economic growth and general political progresses, advancements related to 
human development are still slow in ASEAN. This reflects that on a regional average 
basis, the economic wealth that the region generates does not efficiently revert on its 
population. 
Nevertheless, when the data from Southeast Asia is compared with OPEC, again, 
signs suggest favourable developments in the Asian region. Yet, once more, the 
indicator that brings up more concerns is the human development index which tends 
to score below OPEC’s average. Possible explanations for this matter a varied, 
especially when considering that after the global economic crisis results are poorer. A 
plausible reason could rest in the reduction of Official Development Assistance and 
international developing programs which could have consequently decelerate the 
regional development process. Another conceivable explanation could be based on 
the regions recent history, marked by genocide, multiple wars and several 
dictatorship and even isolationist governments. The legacy left behind these events 
has certainly complicated the promotion of human development and must indeed be 
reflected in the statistical data. 
Still, overall, on a regional average, it could be concluded that ASEAN is progressing 
to avoid the resource curse. 
On a country to country basis, results reveal a different account. Of particular 
relevance are the cases of Lao PDR and Myanmar.  
In the case of Lao PDR, poor results in most of the indicators of the political 
dimension as well as in the social dimension, added to the increasing role that 
natural resource rents are having in the country’s economy, suggest that the risks for 
this country to suffer from the resource curse are relatively high. 
The situation in Myanmar is less conclusive. Lack of economic data concerning the 
country’s natural resource rents has complicated any assessment on the issue. 
Nonetheless, in the context of this economically poor but mineral rich country with 
important endowments of gold, oil and gas, and currently emerging from an 
isolationist period, the growth and involvement of Myanmar’s extractive industry 
should be expected to have a big impact on the country’s domestic economy. In this 
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sense, this could also bring important challenges to promote economic diversification 
and avoid the resource curse. 
Therefore, when assessing individual risks in the Southeast Asian region, results 
differ from the regional perspective, as some countries present greater risks to 
experience the resource curse. With this respect, it would be interesting to consider 
how regional results would change if the statistics of these two countries –Lao PDR 
and Myanmar- were not to be included. Indeed, the region’s average score would 
surely improve, reinforcing the optimistic prospects for ASEAN in this matter. 
All in all, this research paper has questioned the current situation in Southeast Asia 
with regards to the resource curse. Based on the assumption that this phenomenon 
has a direct positive correlation with natural resource rents and a direct negative 
correlation with good governance and human development, the statistical data 
compared has concluded that the region is avoiding this domestic level, some states 
reveal greater risks, exposing the areas where efforts should be concentrated.  
 
4.1 Extend and limitations of the research 
The use of aggregate indicators has allowed this research to compare more complex 
data, incorporating a new array of perceptions and opinions that had not been 
considered in previous similar papers.  
As it was exposed on the introduction, this type of data adds new benefits, assuring 
that a greater amount of interests and ideologies are represented and contemplated 
in the research. This allows the drawing of more substantial and accurate 
conclusions. 
Due to the volume of statistical data compared, one of the main concerns regarding 
the results of the research rests on the calculation of the statistical measurements of 
the aggregate indicators of the political dimension.30  
For the calculation of each of the six indicators, the statistical data used had 
originated in different reports. Although each of the sources encompassed on each 
                                                 
30
 In some cases a total of seventeen statistical measurements have been synthesised in the 
calculation of the aggregate indicators of the political dimension. 
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indicator share similar methodology, they do not include every country. Hence, 
depending on the country, the data for each aggregate indicator has synthesised 
different amounts of statistical data. This might bring up certain methodological 
apprehensions as there are divergences in the amount of data compiled for each of 
the countries studied. 31 However, despite these differences, this does not necessary 
translate into less accuracy, but it only reflects a reality that it is often found by 
researchers who usually have to overcome problems arising from deficits or total lack 
of statistical data. In this sense, this issue must not be seen as a methodological fault 
but as a matter related to the difficulties to acquire valid and reliable data. 
Furthermore it is important to emphasise that this matter has been considered while 
proceeding to analyse and compare the information included on this report. 
In any case, this research has been able to deepen in the matter of the impact of the 
resource curse in Southeast Asia, adding a new perspective on the current situation 
in this issue not only from a regional viewpoint, but also from a country to country 
basis. 
 
4.2 Future lines of research 
The conclusions extracted on this paper open new questions on several different 
aspects related both to the resource curse itself, as well as to the risk it poses to 
certain countries of Southeast Asia. 
On the one hand, the previous literature on the issue has determined different 
causes that contribute to this phenomenon. Nonetheless, even though the economic 
theories seem to propose very convincing arguments, the political theories seem to 
be unable to establish a general theory on the matter. One of the main motives 
behind this, rests on the complexity lying behind any decision-making process which 
is influenced not only by political factors such as type of system and regime, but also 
by other social processes like culture or power of different interest groups. With this 
respect, it could be interesting to explore the connection between the resource curse 
and culture as this would contribute to generate a better general understanding on 
this phenomenon. Particularly, it would be of interest to explore if there are certain 
                                                 
31
 Please see Annex II to get a better understanding of the sources used for each country. 
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common cultural features in those countries suffering from the resource curse. This 
would help in the creation of better preventive frameworks. 
On the other hand, other future lines of investigation could follow two concrete 
perspectives related to the resource curse and Southeast Asia. Firstly, it could be of 
interest analyse Brunei’s historical trajectory to understand how regardless of the 
country’s dependency on oil and gas, this sultanate has been able to pursuit 
successful human, economic and political development. Getting a better 
understanding of this country’s success could help assisting countries with greater 
risks to suffer from this political economy malaise. Secondly, other important 
research could focus on the cases of Lao and Myanmar. Following up domestic 
developing on their respective extractive industry should be of pragmatic importance, 
as data suggest that these countries find themselves at crossroads and decisions 
made today could have a tremendous long-term impact. 
To conclude with, this paper hopes to serve as inspiration for future research on the 
resource curse, because as global population grows and technologies advance, the 
sustainable management of natural resources will not only be crucial for those 
nations possessing them, but also worldwide. 
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Annex I: Statistical Data for each variable 
Table 4- Economic Growth 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Brunei 4.4 0.15 -1.94 -1.77 2.6 2,21 2.15 
Cambodia 10.77 10.21 6.69 0.09 5.96 7,07 7.26 
Indonesia 5.5 6.35 6.01 4.63 6.22 6,49 6.23 
Lao PDR 8.62 7.6 7.82 7.5 8.53 8,04 8.2 
Malaysia 5.59 6.3 4.83 -1.51 7.43 5,13 5.64 
Philippines 5.24 6.62 4.15 1.15 7.63 3,64 6.81 
Thailand 5.09 5.04 2.48 -2.33 7.81 0,08 6.49 
Vietnam 6.98 7.13 5.66 5.4 6.42 6,24 5.25 
ASEAN’s 
Average 
6.52 6.17 4.47 1.5 6.58 4,86 6 
        
Angola 20.74 22.59 13.82 2.41 3.41 3.92 6.83 
Ecuador 4.4 2.19 6.36 0.57 2.95 7.83 5.12 
Iran 5.89 7.82 0.58 3.94 5.89 3 -1.9 
Iraq 10.16 1.38 6.61 5.81 6.9 9.55 9.29 
Kuwait 7.52 5.99 2.48 -7.08 -2.37 6.3 6.19 
Nigeria 8.21 6.83 6.27 6.93 7.84 4.65 6.75 
Saudi Arabia 5.58 5.99 8.43 1.83 7.43 8.57 5.13 
Venezuela 9.87 8.75 5.28 -3.2 -1.49 4.18 5.63 
OPEC’s 
Average 
9.04 7.69 6.23 1.4 3.82 6 5.38 
Source: The World Bank  
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Table 5- Natural Resource Rents 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Brunei 65.31 59.38 71.83 45,57 45.42 42.44 35.99 
Cambodia 2.72 2.67 3.88 3.39 3.85 4.29 4.59 
Indonesia 14.13 13.87 15.91 8.38 8.45 8.9 7.13 
Lao PDR 16.28 15.13 16.91 14.62 18.55 20.78 19.5 
Malaysia 18.53 16.61 19.68 11.61 10.77 10.82 9.8 
Philippines 2.78 5.06 3.08 2.76 3.9 4.42 3.5 
Thailand 5.64 5.38 7.42 4.28 4.29 4.5 4.31 
Vietnam 15.97 15.33 18.21 10.09 11.73 13.37 11.78 
ASEAN’s 
Average 
17.67 16.68 19.61 12.59 13.37 13.69 12.08 
        
Angola 66.38 60.62 67.44 38.73 46.18 45.53 42.90 
Ecuador 25.38 24.58 27.52 15.81 18.63 22.21 19.96 
Iran 53.31 47.06 52.25 28.55 30.85 31.70 25.40 
Iraq 64.99 54.51 57.03 41.32 42.4 47.4 45.96 
Kuwait 60.32 57.08 63.71 44.49 51.74 58.77 55.13 
Nigeria 39.33 35.83 38.09 26.63 28.82 34.26 30.28 
Saudi 
Arabia 
58.35 55.55 64.07 41.51 43.17 50.69 49.73 
Venezuela 44.13 34.60 35.11 18.93 20.46 33.84 28.78 
OPEC’s 
Average 
51,52 46,23 50,65 31,99 35,28 40,55 37,27 
Source: The World Bank 
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Table 6- Human Development Index 
 2006 2007/2008 2009 2010 2011 
Brunei 0.871 0.894 0.92 0.805 0.838 
Cambodia 0.583 0.598 0.593 0.494 0.523 
Indonesia 0.711 0.728 0.734 0.6 0.617 
Lao PDR 0.553 0.601 0.619 0.497 0.524 
Malaysia 0.805 0.811 0.829 0.744 0.761 
Myanmar 0.581 0.583 0.586 0.451 0.483 
Philippines 0.763 0.771 0.751 0.638 0.644 
Thailand 0.784 0.781 0.783 0.654 0.682 
Vietnam 0.709 0.733 0.725 0.572 0.593 
ASEAN 0.71 0.722 0.727 0.606 0.63 
            
Angola 0.439 0.446 0.564 0.403 0.486 
Ecuador 0.765 0.772 0.806 0.695 0.72 
Iran 0.746 0.759 0.782 0.702 0.707 
Kuwait 0.871 0.891 0.916 0.771 0.76 
Libya 0.798 0.818 0.847 0.755 0.76 
Nigeria 0.448 0.47 0.511 0.423 0.459 
Saudi Arabia 0.777 0.812 0.843 0.752 0.77 
Venezuela 0.784 0.792 0.844 0.696 0.735 
OPEC 0.703 0.72 0.764 0.65 0.675 
Source: Human Development Index 
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Table 7- Political Stability & Absence of Violence 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Brunei 94% 94% 90% 75% 73% 86% 79% 
Cambodia 56% 54% 56% 51% 55% 73% 77% 
Indonesia 44% 47% 46% 54% 52% 52% 54% 
Lao PDR 61% 57% 66% 63% 63% 63% 65% 
Malaysia 74% 71% 68% 65% 69% 72% 68% 
Myanmar 43% 40% 38% 40% 39% 39% 43% 
Philippines 32% 36% 34% 37% 38% 46% 48% 
Thailand 46% 44% 43% 44% 40% 47% 43% 
Vietnam 63% 68% 65% 70% 67% 68% 71% 
ASEAN’s 
Average 
57% 57% 56% 55% 55% 61% 61% 
        
Angola 56% 46% 54% 55% 64% 60% 56% 
Ecuador 53% 47% 55% 58% 57% 54% 59% 
Iran 42% 44% 42% 39% 38% 47% 45% 
Iraq 12% 12% 18% 29% 22% 31% 29% 
Kuwait 72% 77% 76% 76% 77% 64% 68% 
Libya 60% 76% 76% 79% 64% 43% 36% 
Nigeria 30% 33% 35% 35% 27% 35% 36% 
Saudi Arabia 55% 56% 58% 56% 64% 55% 56% 
Venezuela 41% 42% 42% 45% 43% 39% 51% 
OPEC’s 
Average 
47% 48% 51% 52% 51% 48% 48% 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
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Table 8- Government Effectiveness 
 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Brunei 79% 79% 73% 69% 69% 69% 69% 
Cambodia 34% 40% 39% 41% 40% 41% 44% 
Indonesia 44% 46% 45% 45% 46% 45% 46% 
Lao PDR 40% 43% 42% 40% 42% 41% 44% 
Malaysia 69% 70% 69% 68% 71% 70% 69% 
Myanmar 29% 26% 27% 21% 25% 25% 28% 
Philippines 32% 36% 34% 37% 38% 46% 48% 
Thailand 46% 44% 44% 44% 40% 47% 43% 
Vietnam 63% 68% 65% 70% 67% 68% 71% 
ASEAN’s Average 48% 50% 49% 48% 49% 50% 51% 
        
Angola 26% 31% 35% 38% 35% 35% 37% 
Ecuador 29% 41% 43% 43% 43% 47% 50% 
Iran 44% 40% 42% 45% 45% 47% 45% 
Iraq 10% 16% 28% 34% 34% 33% 35% 
Kuwait 56% 56% 54% 59% 58% 56% 52% 
Libya 26% 24% 26% 35% 37% 32% 27% 
Nigeria 33% 33% 34% 32% 34% 34% 38% 
Saudi Arabia 49% 49% 49% 50% 52% 47% 56% 
Venezuela 33% 37% 34% 38% 36% 35% 37% 
OPEC’s Average 34% 36% 38% 42% 42% 41% 42% 
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Table 9- Regulatory Quality 
 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Brunei 88% 88% 75% 77% 77% 77% 77% 
Cambodia 49% 51% 51% 50% 51% 48% 53% 
Indonesia 52% 52% 52% 51% 50% 51% 52% 
Lao PDR 38% 39% 38% 39% 39% 39% 43% 
Malaysia 63% 63% 57% 61% 68% 66% 62% 
Myanmar 17% 14% 14% 15% 15% 18% 28% 
Philippines 55% 56% 56% 55% 54% 60% 63% 
Thailand 59% 49% 50% 59% 57% 58% 59% 
Vietnam 48% 49% 47% 48% 48% 52% 52% 
ASEAN 52% 51% 49% 51% 51% 52% 54% 
        
Angola 40% 42% 42% 38% 40% 39% 42% 
Ecuador 42% 40% 38% 35% 36% 39% 41% 
Iran 29% 26% 25% 23% 26% 30% 32% 
Iraq 33% 36% 40% 43% 43% 44% 40% 
Kuwait 65% 60% 60% 60% 60% 59% 55% 
Libya 33% 40% 44% 38% 36% 28% 30% 
Nigeria 41% 41% 43% 45% 45% 45% 46% 
Saudi Arabia 56% 56% 59% 60% 62% 60% 61% 
Venezuela 38% 34% 33% 29% 28% 32% 32% 
OPEC 42% 42% 43% 41% 42% 42% 42% 
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Table 10- Rule of Law 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Brunei 51% 67% 67% 63% 63% 69% 68% 
Cambodia 32% 37% 33% 37% 37% 39% 39% 
Indonesia 47% 45% 46% 47% 45% 47% 48% 
Lao PDR 37% 41% 43% 37% 42% 43% 46% 
Malaysia 57% 55% 51% 55% 55% 59% 59% 
Myanmar 28% 27% 27% 27% 26% 30% 34% 
Philippines 49% 50% 44% 43% 45% 52% 53% 
Thailand 56% 55% 51% 48% 51% 52% 53% 
Vietnam 46% 46% 47% 44% 43% 46% 47% 
ASEAN 45% 47% 45% 45% 45% 49% 50% 
        
Angola 33% 32% 30% 33% 31% 31% 30% 
Ecuador 44% 44% 42% 41% 40% 38% 42% 
Iran 34% 32% 33% 31% 33% 35% 36% 
Iraq 27% 19% 28% 32% 32% 33% 35% 
Kuwait 65% 61% 61% 61% 61% 61% 58% 
Libya 31% 33% 34% 34% 36% 31% 34% 
Nigeria 41% 41% 44% 42% 42% 40% 41% 
Saudi Arabia 54% 51% 50% 52% 54% 52% 54% 
Venezuela 30% 31% 29% 29% 27% 29% 28% 
OPEC 40% 38% 39% 39% 40% 39% 40% 
 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
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Table 11- Control of Corruption 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Brunei 53% 53% 49% 67% 67% 67% 58% 
Cambodia 26% 27% 28% 26% 25% 28% 30% 
Indonesia 33% 38% 38% 34% 34% 35% 33% 
Lao PDR 23% 26% 30% 27% 28% 30% 33% 
Malaysia 48% 48% 44% 44% 47% 47% 49% 
Myanmar 13% 12% 12% 14% 12% 13% 21% 
Philippines 33% 34% 36% 36% 32% 36% 38% 
Thailand 38% 32% 37% 42% 39% 40% 39% 
Vietnam 37% 38% 37% 39% 39% 41% 39% 
ASEAN 34% 34% 35% 37% 36% 37% 38% 
        
Angola 26% 25% 23% 19% 23% 22% 22% 
Ecuador 39% 45% 43% 40% 40% 31% 39% 
Iran 35% 31% 27% 27% 26% 28% 31% 
Iraq 11% 11% 20% 27% 25% 27% 25% 
Kuwait 57% 56% 59% 56% 57% 52% 40% 
Libya 21% 25% 28% 21% 19% 15% 18% 
Nigeria 32% 33% 36% 33% 32% 29% 32% 
Saudi Arabia 38% 40% 45% 44% 47% 40% 44% 
Venezuela 33% 31% 30% 32% 33% 33% 30% 
OPEC 32% 33% 35% 33% 34% 31% 31% 
 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
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Table 12: Voice and Accountability 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Brunei 53% 53% 49% 67% 67% 67% 58% 
Cambodia 26% 27% 28% 26% 25% 28% 30% 
Indonesia 33% 38% 38% 34% 34% 35% 33% 
Lao PDR 23% 26% 30% 27% 28% 30% 33% 
Malaysia 48% 48% 44% 44% 47% 47% 49% 
Myanmar 13% 12% 12% 14% 12% 13% 21% 
Philippines 33% 34% 36% 36% 32% 36% 38% 
Thailand 38% 32% 37% 42% 39% 40% 39% 
Vietnam 37% 38% 37% 39% 39% 41% 39% 
ASEAN 34% 34% 35% 37% 36% 37% 38% 
        
Angola 26% 25% 23% 19% 23% 22% 22% 
Ecuador 39% 45% 43% 40% 40% 31% 39% 
Iran 35% 31% 27% 27% 26% 28% 31% 
Iraq 11% 11% 20% 27% 25% 27% 25% 
Kuwait 57% 56% 59% 56% 57% 52% 40% 
Libya 21% 25% 28% 21% 19% 15% 18% 
Nigeria 32% 33% 36% 33% 32% 29% 32% 
Saudi Arabia 38% 40% 45% 44% 47% 40% 44% 
Venezuela 33% 31% 30% 32% 33% 33% 30% 
OPEC 32% 33% 35% 33% 34% 31% 31% 
 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
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Annex II: Good Governance Indicators by country and source of origin 
Table 13- Political Stability and Absence of Violence (Sources used for ASEAN) 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
 
 
Table 14- Political Stability and Absence of Violence (Sources used for OPEC) 
 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
EIU X X X X X X X X X 
GCS X X X  X  X X X 
HUM X X X X X X X X X 
IJT X X X X X X X X X 
IPD  X X X X X X X X 
PRS X  X  X X X X X 
WCY   X  X  X X  
WJP  X X  X  X X X 
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
 Angola Ecuador Iran Iraq Kuwait Libya Nigeria 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Venezuela 
EIU X X X X X X X X X 
GCS  X X  X X X X X 
HUM X X X X X X X X X 
IJT X X X X X X X X X 
IPD X X X X X X X X X 
PRS X X X X X X X X X 
WCY         X 
WJP  X X    X  X 
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
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Table 15- Government Effectiveness (Sources used for ASEAN) 
 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
 
Table 16- Government Effectiveness (Sources used for OPEC) 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
 
 
 
 
 Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
ADB          
AFR          
ASD  X X X     X 
BPS          
BTI  X X X X X X X X 
EIU X X X X X X X X X 
GCS X X X  X  X X X 
GWP  X X X X X X X X 
IFD  X X X X X X X X 
IPD  X X X X X X X X 
LBO          
PIA  X  X     X 
PRS X  X  X X X X X 
WCY   X  X  X X  
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
 Angola Ecuador Iran Iraq Kuwait Libya Nigeria 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Venezuela 
ADB X     X X   
AFR          
ASD          
BPS X    X X X X X 
BTI  X X X      
EIU X X X  X X X X X 
GCS X X X X X X X X X 
GWP X X X  X X X X X 
IFD X X X    X  X 
IPD X X X X X X X X X 
LBO X X  X   X   
PIA X   X X X X X X 
PRS  X X      X 
WCY       X  X 
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
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Table 17- Regulatory Quality (Sources used for ASEAN) 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
 
 
 
Table 18- Regulatory Quality (Sources used for OPEC) 
 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
ADB          
ASD  X  X     X 
BPS          
BTI  X X X X X X X X 
EBR          
EIU X X X X X X X X X 
GCS X X X  X  X X X 
HER  X X X X X X X X 
IFD  X X X X X X X X 
IPD  X X X X X X X X 
PIA  X  X     X 
PRS X  X  X X X X X 
WCY   X  X  X X  
WJP  X X  X  X X X 
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
 Angola Ecuador Iran Iraq Kuwait Libya Nigeria Saudi 
Arabia 
Venezuela 
ADB X     X X   
ASD          
BPS          
BTI X X X X X X X X X 
EBR          
EIU X X X X X X X X X 
GCS X X   X X X X X 
HER X X   X X X X X 
IFD X X X X   X  X 
IPD X X X X X X X X X 
PIA X      X   
PRS X X X X X X X X X 
WCY         X 
WJP  X     X  X 
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
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Table 19- Rule of Law (Sources used for ASEAN) 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
 
Table 20- Rule of Law (Sources used for OPEC) 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
 Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
ADB          
AFR          
ASD  X X X     X 
BPS          
BTI  X X X X X X X X 
CCR  X X X X X X X X 
EIU X X X X X X X X X 
FRH          
GCS X X X  X  X X X 
GII  X X  X  X X X 
GWP  X X X X X X X X 
HER  X X X X X X X X 
HUM X X X X X X X X X 
IFD  X X X X X X X X 
IPD  X X X X X X X X 
LBO          
PIA  X  X     X 
PRS X  X  X X X X X 
TPR X X X X X X X X X 
VAB          
WCY   X  X  X X  
WJP  X X  X  X X X 
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
 Angola Ecuador Iran Iraq Kuwait Libya Nigeria 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Venezuela 
ADB X     X X   
AFR       X   
ASD          
BPS          
BTI X X X X X X X X X 
CCR X X X   X X X X 
EIU X X X X X X X X X 
FRH          
GCS X X X  X X X X X 
GII X X  X   X  X 
GWP X X X X X X X X X 
HER X X X  X X X X X 
HUM X X X X X X X X X 
IFD X X X X   X  X 
IPD X X X X X X X X X 
LBO  X       X 
PIA X      X   
PRS X X X X X X X X X 
TPR X X X X X X X X X 
VAB  X       X 
WCY         X 
WJP  X X    X  X 
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
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Table 21- Control of Corruption (Sources used for ASEAN) 
 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
 
Table 22- Control of Corruption (Sources used for OPEC) 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
 Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
ADB          
AFR          
ASD  X X X     X 
BPS          
BTI  X X X X X X X X 
CCR  X X X X X X X X 
EIU X X X X X X X X X 
FRH          
GCB X X X  X  X X X 
GCS X X X  X  X X X 
GII  X X  X  X X X 
GWP  X X X X  X X X 
IFD  X X X X X X X X 
IPD  X X X X X X X X 
LBO          
PIA  X  X     X 
PRS  X X  X X X X X 
TPR X  X  X X X X X 
VAB          
WCY   X  X  X X  
WJP  X X  X  X X X 
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
 Angola Ecuador Iran Iraq Kuwait Libya Nigeria 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Venezuela 
ADB X     X X   
AFR       X   
ASD          
BPS          
BTI X X X X X X X X X 
CCR X X X   X X X X 
EIU X X X X X X X X X 
FRH          
GCB  X  X X X X  X 
GCS X X X  X X X X X 
GII X X     X  X 
GWP X X X X  X X X X 
IFD X X  X   X  X 
IPD X X X X X X X X X 
LBO  X       X 
PIA X      X   
PRS          
TPR X X X X X X X X X 
VAB  X       X 
WCY         X 
WJP  X X    X  X 
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
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Table 23- Voice and Accountability (Sources used for ASEAN) 
Source: The World Bank Institute 
Table 24- Voice and Accountability (Sources used for OPEC) 
 Source: The World Bank Institute 
 Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
AFR          
BTI  X X X X X X X X 
CCR  X X X X X X X X 
EIU X X X X X X X X X 
FRH X X X X X X X X X 
GCS X X X  X  X X X 
GII  X X  X  X X X 
GWP  X X X X  X X X 
HUM X X X X X X X X X 
IFD  X X X X X X X X 
IPD  X X X X X X X X 
IRP          
LBO          
MSI          
OBI  X X  X X X X X 
PRS X  X  X X X X X 
RSF X X X X X X X X X 
VAB          
WCY   X  X  X X  
WJP  X X  X  X X X 
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
 Angola Ecuador Iran Iraq Kuwait Libya Nigeria 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Venezuela 
AFR       X   
BTI X X X X X X X X X 
CCR X X X   X X X X 
EIU X X X X X X X X X 
FRH X X X X X X X X X 
GCS X X X  X X X X X 
GII X X  X   X  X 
GWP X X X X X  X X X 
HUM X X X X X X X X X 
IFD X X  X   X  X 
IPD X X X X X X X X X 
IRP X     X X   
LBO  X       X 
MSI X  X X X X X X  
OBI X X  X   X X X 
PRS X X X X X X X X X 
RSF X X X X X X X X X 
VAB  X       X 
WCY         X 
WJP  X X    X  X 
WMO X X X X X X X X X 
